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Abstract
Cloud services have recently exploded with the advent
of powerful cloud-computing platforms such as Amazon
Web Services and Microsoft Azure. Today, most cloud
services are accessed through REST APIs, and Swag-
ger is arguably the most popular interface-description
language for REST APIs. A Swagger specification de-
scribes how to access a cloud service through its REST
API (e.g., what requests the service can handle and what
responses may be expected).
This paper introduces REST-ler, the first automatic in-
telligent REST API security-testing tool. REST-ler ana-
lyzes a Swagger specification and generates tests that ex-
ercise the corresponding cloud service through its REST
API. Each test is defined as a sequence of requests and
responses. REST-ler generates tests intelligently by (1)
inferring dependencies among request types declared in
the Swagger specification (e.g., inferring that “a request
B should not be executed before a request A” because B
takes as an input argument a resource-id x returned by A)
and by (2) analyzing dynamic feedback from responses
observed during prior test executions in order to generate
new tests (e.g., learning that “a request C after a request
sequence A;B is refused by the service” and therefore
avoiding this combination in the future). We show that
these two techniques are necessary to thoroughly exer-
cise a service under test while pruning the large search
space of possible request sequences. We also discuss the
application of REST-ler to test GitLab, a large popular
open-source self-hosted Git service, and the new bugs
that were found.
1 Introduction
Over the last decade, we have seen an explosion in cloud
services for hosting software applications (Software-as-
a-Service), for data processing (Platform-as-a-Service),
and for providing general computing infrastructure
(Infrastructure-as-a-Service). Today, most cloud ser-
vices, such as those provided by Amazon Web Services
and Microsoft Azure, are programmatically accessed
through REST APIs [9] by third-party applications [1]
∗The work of this author was mostly done while visiting Microsoft
Research.
and other services [25]. Meanwhile, Swagger [36] (re-
cently renamed OpenAPI) has arguably become the most
popular interface-description language for REST APIs.
A Swagger specification describes how to access a cloud
service through its REST API, including what requests
the service can handle and what responses may be ex-
pected in what format.
Tools for automatically testing cloud services via their
REST APIs and checking whether those services are reli-
able and secure are still in their infancy. The most sophis-
ticated testing tools currently available for REST APIs
capture live API traffic, and then parse, fuzz and replay
the traffic with the hope of finding bugs [3, 29, 6, 37, 2].
Many of these tools were born as extensions of more es-
tablished web-site testing and scanning tools (see Sec-
tion 6). Since these REST API testing tools are all re-
cent and not widely used, it is currently unknown how ef-
fective they are in finding bugs and how security-critical
those bugs are.
In this paper, we introduce REST-ler, the first auto-
matic intelligent REST API fuzzing tool. Fuzzing [35]
means automatic test generation and execution with the
goal of finding security vulnerabilities. Unlike other
REST API testing tools, REST-ler performs a lightweight
static analysis of an entire Swagger specification, and
then generates and executes tests that exercise the cor-
responding cloud service through its REST API. Each
test is defined as a sequence of requests and responses.
REST-ler generates tests intelligently by
1. inferring dependencies among request types de-
clared in the Swagger specification (e.g., inferring
that a resource included in the response of a request
A is necessary as input argument of another request
B, and therefore that A should be executed before
B), and by
2. analyzing dynamic feedback from responses ob-
served during prior test executions in order to gener-
ate new tests (e.g., learning that “a request C after a
request sequence A;B is refused by the service” and
therefore avoiding this combination in the future).
We present empirical evidence that these two techniques
(partly inspired by prior work on API testing for object-
oriented programs [27]) are necessary to thoroughly ex-
ercise a service under test while pruning the large search
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space defined by all possible request sequences. REST-
ler also implements several search strategies (some in-
spired by prior work on model-based testing [40]),
and we compare their effectiveness while fuzzing Git-
Lab [11], a large popular open-source self-hosted Git ser-
vice with a complex REST API. During the course of
our experiments, we found several new bugs in GitLab,
including security-relevant ones (see Section 5).
In summary, this paper makes the following contribu-
tions:
• We introduce REST-ler, the first automatic intelli-
gent fuzzing tool for REST APIs which analyzes a
Swagger specification, automatically infers depen-
dencies among request types, generates tests de-
fined as request sequences satisfying those depen-
dencies, and dynamically learns what request se-
quences are valid or invalid by analyzing the service
responses to those tests.
• We present detailed experimental evidence showing
that the techniques used in REST-ler are necessary
for effective automated REST API fuzzing.
• We also present experimental results obtained with
three different strategies for searching the large
search space defined by all possible request se-
quences, and discuss their strengths and weak-
nesses.
• We present a detailed case study with GitLab, a
large popular open-source self-hosted Git service,
and discuss several new bugs found so far and their
severity.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next Sec-
tion, we describe Swagger specifications and how they
are processed by REST-ler. In Section 3, we present
the main test-generation algorithm used in REST-ler, and
discuss different search strategies and other implementa-
tion details. In Section 4, we present experimental results
evaluating the effectiveness of the test-generation tech-
niques and search strategies implemented in REST-ler.
In Section 5, we discuss several new bugs found in Git-
Lab during the course of this work. We discuss related
work in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
2 Processing API Specifications
In this paper, we consider cloud services accessible
through REST APIs described with a Swagger specifica-
tion. A Swagger specification describes how to access a
cloud service through its REST API (e.g., what requests
the service can handle and what responses may be ex-
pected). A client program can send messages, called re-
quests, to a service and receive messages back, called
responses. Such messages are sent over the HTTP proto-
Fig. 1: Swagger Specification of Blog Posts Service
basePath: ’/api’
swagger: ’2.0’
definitions:
”Blog Post”:
properties:
body:
type: string
id:
type: integer
required:
−body
type: object
paths:
”/blog/posts/”
post:
parameters:
−in: body
name: payload
required: true
schema:
ref: ”/definitions/Blog Post”
from restler import requests
from restler import dependencies
def parse posts(data):
post id = data[”id”]
dependencies.set var(post id)
request = requests.Request(
restler static(”POST”),
restler static(”/api/blog/posts/”),
restler static(”HTTP/1.1”),
restler static(”{”),
restler static(”body:”),
restler fuzzable(”string”),
restler static(”}”),
’post send’: {
’parser’: parse posts,
’dependencies’: [
post id.writer(),
]
}
)
Fig. 2: Swagger Specification and Automatically Derived
REST-ler Grammar. Shows a snippet of Swagger specifica-
tion in YAML format (left) and the corresponding grammar
generated by REST-ler (right).
col. Given a Swagger specification, open-source Swag-
ger tools can automatically generate a web UI that al-
lows users to view the documentation and interact with
the API via a web browser.
An example of Swagger specification in web-UI form
is shown in Figure 1. This specification describes five
types of requests supported by a simple service for host-
ing blog posts. This service allows users to create, ac-
cess, update and delete blog posts. In a web browser,
clicking on any of these five request types expands the
description of the request type.
For instance, selecting the second request, which is a
POST request, reveals text similar to the left of Figure 2.
This text is in YAML format and describes the exact syn-
tax expected for that specific request and its response. In
this case, the definition part of the specification in-
dicates that an object named body of type string is
required and that an object named id of type integer
is optional (since it is not required). The path part of
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 
Sending: POST /api/blog/posts/ HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json
Content−Type: application/json
Host: localhost:8888
{”body”:”sampleString”}
Received: HTTP/1.1 201 CREATED
Content−Type: application/json
Content−Length: 37
Server: Werkzeug/0.14.1 Python/2.7.12
Date: Sun, 01 Apr 2018 05:10:32 GMT
{”body”: ”sampleString”, ”id”: 5889} 
Fig. 3: REST-ler Trace of HTTP Request and Response.
Shows a network-layer REST-ler trace with a POST request
creating a blog post and the respective response.
the specification describes the HTTP-syntax for a POST
request of this type as well as the format of the expected
response.
From such a specification, REST-ler automatically
constructs the test-generation grammar shown on the
right of Figure 2. This grammar is encoded in executable
python code. It mainly consists of code to generate an
HTTP request, of type POST in this case. Each com-
mand restler static simply appends the string it
takes as argument without modifying it. In contrast, the
command restler fuzzable takes as argument a
value type (like string in this example) and replaces it
by one value of that type taken from a (small) dictionary
of values for that type. How dictionaries are defined and
how values are selected is discussed in the next section.
The grammar on the right also includes code to pro-
cess the expected response of the request. In this case,
the response is expected to return a new object named
id of type integer. Using the schema specified on
the left, REST-ler automatically generates the function
parse posts shown on the right. Figure 3 shows an
example of a HTTP-level trace of a single POST request
generated by REST-ler for the blog posts service and the
corresponding response.
By similarly analyzing the other request types de-
scribed in this Swagger specification, REST-ler will in-
fer automatically that ids returned by such POST re-
quests are necessary to generate well-formed requests
of the last three request types shown in Figure 1 which
each requires an id. These dependencies are extracted
by REST-ler when processing the Swagger specification
and are later used for test generation, as described next.
3 REST-ler
3.1 Test Generation Algorithm
The main algorithm for test generation used by REST-
ler is shown in Figure 4 in python-like notation. It
1 Inputs: swagger spec, maxLength
2 # Set of requests parsed from the Swagger API spec
3 reqSet = PROCESS(swagger spec)
4 # Set of request sequences (initially empty)
5 seqSet = {}
6 # Main loop: iterate up to a given maximum sequence length
7 n = 1
8 while (n =< maxLength):
9 seqSet = EXTEND(seqSet, reqSet)
10 seqSet = RENDER(seqSet)
11 n = n + 1
12 # Extend all sequences in seqSet by appending
13 # new requests whose dependencies are satisfied
14 def EXTEND(seqSet, reqSet):
15 newSeqSet = {}
16 for seq in seqSet:
17 for req in reqSet:
18 if DEPENDENCIES(seq, req):
19 newSeqSet = newSeqSet + concat(seq, req)
20 return newSeqSet
21 # Concretize all newly appended requests using dictionary values,
22 # execute each new request sequence and keep the valid ones
23 def RENDER(seqSet):
24 newSeqSet = {}
25 for seq in seqSet:
26 req = last request in(seq)
27 ~V = tuple of fuzzable types in(req)
28 for~v in ~V :
29 newReq = concretize(req,~v)
30 newSeq = concat(seq, newReq)
31 response = EXECUTE(newSeq)
32 if response has a valid code:
33 newSeqSet = newSeqSet + newSeq
34 else:
35 log error
36 return newSeqSet
37 # Check that all objects referenced in a request are produced
38 # by some response in a prior request sequence
39 def DEPENDENCIES(seq, req):
40 if CONSUMES(req) ⊆ PRODUCES(seq):
41 return True
42 else:
43 return False
44 # Objects required in a request
45 def CONSUMES(req):
46 return object types required in(req)
47 # Objects produced in the responses of a sequence of requests
48 def PRODUCES(seq):
49 dynamicObjects = {}
50 for req in seq:
51 newObjs = objects produced in response of(req)
52 dynamicObjects = dynamicObjects + newObjs
53 return dynamicObjects
Fig. 4: Main Algorithm used in REST-ler.
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starts (line 3) by processing a Swagger specification as
discussed in the previous section. The result of this pro-
cessing is a set of request types, denoted reqSet in Fig-
ure 4, and of their dependencies (more on this later).
The algorithm computes a set of request sequences,
denoted seqSet and initially empty (line 5). At each
iteration of its main loop (line 8), the algorithm computes
all valid request sequences seqSet of length n, starting
with n = 1 before moving to n+1 and so on until a user-
specified maxLength is reached. Computing seqSet
is done in two steps.
First, the set of valid request sequences of length n−1
is extended (line 8) by appending at the end of each se-
quence one new request whose dependencies are satis-
fied, for all possible requests, as described in the EX-
TEND function (line 14). The function DEPENDEN-
CIES (line 39) checks that all the object types required
in the last request, denoted by CONSUMES(req), are
produced by some response in the request sequence pre-
ceding it, denoted by PRODUCES(seq). If all the de-
pendencies are satisfied, the new sequence of length n is
retained (line 19), otherwise it is discarded.
Second, each newly-extended request sequence whose
dependencies are satisfied is rendered (line 10) one by
one as described in the RENDER function (line 23).
For every newly-appended request (line 26), the list of
all fuzzable primitive types in the request is computed
(line 27) (those are identified by restler fuzzable
in the code shown on the right of Figure 2). Then,
each fuzzable primitive type in the request is replaced
by one concrete value of that type taken out of a finite
(and small) dictionary of values. The function REN-
DER generates all possible such combinations (line 28).
Each combination thus defines a fully-defined request
newReq (line 29) which is HTTP-syntactically correct.
The function RENDER then executes this new request
sequence (line 31), and checks its response: if the re-
sponse has a valid return code (defined here as any code
in the 200 range), the new request sequence is “valid”
and retained (line 33), otherwise it is discarded and the
received error code is logged for further analysis and de-
bugging.
More precisely, the function EXECUTE executes each
request in a sequence request one by one, each time
checking that the response is valid, extracting and mem-
oizing dynamic objects (if any), and providing those in
subsequent requests in the sequence if needed, as deter-
mined by the dependency analysis; the response returned
by function EXECUTE in line 31 refers to the response
received for the last, newly-appended request in the se-
quence. Note that if a request sequence produces more
than one dynamic object of a given type, the function
EXECUTE will memoize all of those objects, but will
provide them later when needed by subsequent requests
in the exact order in which they are produced; in other
words, the function EXECUTE will not try different or-
dering of such objects. If a dynamic object is passed as
argument to a subsequent request and is “destroyed” after
that request, that is, it becomes unusable later on, REST-
ler will detect this by receiving an invalid response (400
or 500 error code) when attempting to reuse that unus-
able object, and will then discard that request sequence.
For each fuzzable primitive type, the algorithm of Fig-
ure 4 uses a small set of values of that type, called dictio-
nary, and picks one of these values in order to concretize
that fuzzable type (lines 27-29). For instance, for fuzz-
able type integer, REST-ler might use a small dictio-
nary with the values 0, 1, and -10, while for fuzzable type
string, a dictionary could be defined with the values
“sampleString”, the empty string and one very long fixed
string. The user defines those dictionaries.
By default, the function RENDER of Figure 4 gen-
erates all possible combinations of dictionary values for
every request with several fuzzable types (see line 28).
For large dictionaries, this may result in astronomical
numbers of combinations. In that case, a more scalable
option is to randomly sample each dictionary for one
(or a few) values, or to use combinatorial-testing algo-
rithms [8] for covering, say, every dictionary value, or
every pair of values, but not every k-tuple. In the exper-
iments reported later, we used small dictionaries and the
default RENDER function shown in Figure 4.
The function EXTEND of Figure 4 generates all re-
quest sequences of length n+1 whose dependencies are
satisfied. Since n is incremented at each iteration of the
main loop of line 8, the overall algorithm performs a
breadth-first search (BFS) in the search space defined by
all possible request sequences. In Section 4, we report
experiments performed also with two additional search
strategies: BFS-Fast and RandomWalk.
BFS-Fast. In function EXTEND, the loops of line 17
and line 18 are swapped in such a way that every re-
quest req in reqSet is appended only once to some
request sequence in seqSet in line 19, resulting in a
smaller set newSeqSet which covers (i.e., includes at
least once) every request but does not generate all valid
request sequences. Like BFS, BFS-Fast thus still pro-
vides full grammar-coverage at each iteration of the main
loop in line 8, but it generates fewer request sequences,
which allows it to go deeper more quickly than BFS.
RandomWalk. In function EXTEND, the two loops of
line 17 and line 18 are eliminated; instead, the function
now returns a single new request sequence whose de-
pendencies are satisfied, and generated by randomly se-
lecting one request sequence seq in seqSet and one
request in reqSet. (The function randomly chooses
such a pair until all the dependencies of that pair are sat-
isfied.) This search strategy will therefore explore the
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search space of possible request sequences deeper more
quickly than BFS or BFS-Fast. When RandomWalk can
no longer extend the current request sequence, it restarts
from scratch from an empty request sequence. (Since
it does not memoize past request sequences between
restarts, it might regenerate the same request sequence
again in the future.)
3.2 Implementation Details
We have implemented REST-ler with 2,230 lines of
python code. Its functionality is split into four modules:
the main application entry point, the parser and compiler
module, the core fuzzing engine, and the logging mod-
ule.
The main application entry-point is responsible for
starting a fuzzing session according to a set of config-
uration parameters controlling: the Swagger specifica-
tion which should be used to derive an input grammar
and perform fuzzing; the desired search strategy, includ-
ing BFS, BFS-Fast, and RandomWalk; the maximum se-
quence length and the maximum fuzzing time; the HTTP
status codes indicating errors (e.g., 500); the dictionary
of fuzzing mutations to be used when rendering fuzz-
able primitive types; and the port and IP-address of the
fuzzing target along with any additional authorization to-
kens.
The parser and compiler module is responsible for
parsing a Swagger specification and generating a REST-
ler grammar for fuzzing the target service. In the ab-
sence of a Swagger specification, the user can manually
provide a REST-ler grammar to be used for fuzzing.
The core engine module implements the algorithm of
Figure 4, and is responsible for rendering API requests
and for composing sequences of requests using any of
the supported search strategies. The rendered request
sequences are sent to the target service using send on
python sockets. Similarly, the corresponding response
is received using recv on python sockets.
Finally, the logging module monitors client/service
interactions and traces all messages exchanged via
python sockets. Sequences of requests sent to the tar-
get service, along with the corresponding HTTP status
codes received from the service, are persistently stored
and inspected for errors and bug detection.
3.3 Current Limitations
Currently REST-ler only supports token-based authoriza-
tion, such as OAUTH [26], and there in no support for
operations that involve web-UI interactions. Moreover,
REST-ler does not support requests for API endpoints
that depend on server-side redirects (e.g., 301 “Moved
Permanently”, 303 “See Other”, and 307 “Temporary
Redirect”). Finally, our current REST-ler prototype can
only find bugs defined as unexpected HTTP status codes,
namely 500 “Internal Server Error”. Such a simple test
oracle cannot detect vulnerabilities that are not visible
though HTTP status codes (e.g., “Information Exposure”
and others). Despite these limitations, REST-ler is al-
ready useful in finding security-relevant bugs, as will be
discussed in Section 5.
4 Evaluation
We present experimental results obtained with REST-ler
that answer the following questions:
Q1: Are both inferring dependencies among request
types and analyzing dynamic feedback necessary
for effective automated REST API fuzzing? (Sec-
tion 4.2)
Q2: Are tests generated by REST-ler exercising deeper
service-side logic as sequence length increases?
(Section 4.3)
Q3: What search strategy should be used in REST-ler?
(Section 4.4)
We answer the first question (Q1) using a simple Model-
View-Controller (MVC) blog posts service with a REST
API. We answer (Q2), and (Q3) using GitLab, an open-
source, production-scale 1 web service for self-hosted
Git. We conclude the evaluation by discussing in Sec-
tion 4.5 how to bucketize (i.e., group together) the nu-
merous bugs that can be reported by REST-ler in order
to facilitate their analysis. Afterwards, we move on to
Section 5 where we discuss new bugs found in GitLab.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Blog Posts Service. We answer (Q1) using a simple
blog posts service, written in 189 lines of python code
using the Flask web framework [10] and following the
MVC web development paradigm. Every blog post is
persistently stored in a SQLite [33] database and has
a user-assigned body, an automatically-assigned post id
(primary key), and an automatically-derived checksum
(SHA-1) of the blog post’s body. The service’s func-
tionality is exposed over a REST API with a Swagger
specification shown in Figure 1. This API contains five
request types: (i) GET on /posts : returns all blog
posts currently registered; (ii) POST on /posts : cre-
ates a new blog post (body: the text of the blog post);
(iii) DELETE /posts/id : deletes a blog post; (iv)
GET posts/id : returns the body and the checksum
of an individual blog post; and (v) PUT /posts/id :
1 GitLab [11] is used by more than 100,000 organizations, has mil-
lions of users, and has currently a 2/3 market share of the self-hosted
Git market [14].
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updates the contents of a blog post (body: the new text
of the blog post and the checksum of the older version of
the blog post’s text). To model an imaginary subtle bug,
at every update of a blog post (PUT request with body
text and checksum) the service checks if the checksum
provided in the request matches the recorded checksum
for the current blog post, and if it does, an uncaught ex-
ception is raised. Thus, this bug will be triggered and
detected only if dependencies on dynamic objects shared
across requests are taken into account during test gener-
ation.
Gitlab. We answer (Q2) and (Q3) using GitLab, an
open-source web service for self-hosted Git. GitLab’s
back-end functionality is written in over 376K lines of
ruby code using ruby-on-rails [31]. It follows the MVC
web development paradigm and exposes its functional-
ity over a REST API. GitLab’s API is extensively doc-
umented and has hundreds of individual API requests
spread across 63 groups [12]. There is a publicly avail-
able GitLab Swagger specification which we used for
our experiments [15]. A typical GitLab deployment con-
sists of the following components: (i) a low-level HTTP
server used to proxy-pass the Rails Unicorn web server,
(ii) a Sidekiq job queue which, in turn, uses (iii) redis as
a non-persistent database, and (iv) a structured database
for persistent storage. We follow this deployment and,
unless otherwise specified, apply the following configu-
ration settings: we use Nginx to proxypass the Unicorn
web server and configure 10 Unicorn workers limited to
up to 900MB of physical memory; we use postgreSQL
for persistent storage configured with a pool of 10 work-
ers; we use GitLab’s default configuration for sidekiq
queues and reddis workers; finally, we mount the reposi-
tories’ destination folder in physical memory. According
to GitLab’s deployment recommendations, our configu-
ration should scale up to 4,000 concurrent users [13].
Fuzzing Dictionaries. For the experiments in this sec-
tion, we use the following dictionaries for fuzzable prim-
itives types: string has possible values “sampleString”
and “” (empty string); integer has possible values “0” and
“1”; boolean has possible values “true” and “ f alse”.
All experiments were run on Ubuntu 16.04 Microsoft
Azure VMs configured with eight Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-
2673 v3 @ 2.40GHz CPU cores and 28GB of physical
memory, unless otherwise specified.
4.2 Techniques for Effective REST API
Fuzzing
In this section, we report experimental results with our
blog posts service to determine whether both (1) infer-
ring dependencies among request types and (2) analyzing
dynamic feedback are necessary for effective automated
REST API fuzzing (Q1). We choose a controled experi-
ment with a known simple blog-posts service in order to
clearly measure and interpret the testing capabilities of
the two core techniques being evaluated. Those capabil-
ities are evaluated by measuring service code coverage
and client-visible HTTP status codes.
Specifically, we compare results obtained when ex-
haustively generating all possible request sequences of
length up to three, with three different test-generation al-
gorithms:
1. REST-ler ignores dependencies among request
types and treats dynamic objects – such as post
id and checksum – as fuzzable primitive type
string objects, while still analyzing dynamic
feedback.
2. REST-ler ignores service-side dynamic feedback
and does not eliminate invalid request sequences
during its search, but still infers dependencies
among request types and generates request se-
quences satisfying such dependencies.
3. REST-ler follows the algorithm of Figure 4 and uses
both dependencies among request types and dy-
namic feedback.
Figure 5 shows the number of tests, i.e., request se-
quences, generated up to maximum length 3 by each of
these three algorithms, from left to right. At the top, the
figure shows cumulative code coverage measured in lines
of python code (using python’s settrace system util-
ity) and increasing over time, as well as when the se-
quence length increases (from 1 to 3). At the bottom,
the figure shows the cumulative number of HTTP status
code received as responses so far.
Code Coverage. First, we observe that without consid-
ering dependencies among request types (Figure 5, top
left), code coverage is limited to up to 130 lines and
there is no increase over time, despite increasing the
length of request sequences. This is expected and illus-
trates the limitations of a naive approach to effectively
test a service where values of dynamic objects like id
and checksum cannot be randomly guessed or picked
among values in a small predefined dictionary. On the
other hand, by infering dependencies among requests
manipulating such objects REST-ler achieves an increase
in code coverage up to 150 lines of code (Figure 5, top
both center and right).
Second, we can see that without considering dynamic
feedback to prune invlid request sequences in the search
space (Figure 5, top center), the number of tests gen-
erated grows quickly, even for a simple API. Specifi-
cally, without considering dynamic feedback (Figure 5,
top center), REST-ler produces more that 4,600 tests that
take 1,750 seconds and cover about 150 lines of code; in
contrast, by considering dynamic feedback (Figure 5, top
right), the state space is significantly reduced and REST-
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Fig. 5: Code Coverage and HTTP Status Codes Over Time. Shows the increase in code coverage over time (top) and the
cumulative number of HTTP status codes received over time (bottom), for the simple blog posts service. Left: REST-ler ignores
dependencies among request types. Center: REST-ler ignores dynamic feedback. Right: REST-ler utilizes both dependencies among
request types and dynamic feedback. When leveraging both techniques, REST-ler achieves the best code coverage and finds the
planted 500 “Internal Server Error” bug with the least number of tests.
ler can achieve the same code coverage with less than
800 test cases and only 179 seconds.
HTTP Status Codes. We make two observations. First,
focusing on 40X status codes, we notice a high num-
ber of 40X responses when ignoring dynamic feedback
(Figure 5, bottom center). This is expected since without
considering service-side dynamic feedback, the number
of possible invalid request sequences grows quickly. In
contrast, considering dynamic feedback dramatically de-
creases the percentage of 40X status codes from 60% to
26% (Figure 5, bottom left) and 20% (Figure 5, bottom
right), respectively, without or with using dependencies
among request types. Moreover, when also using depen-
dencies among request types (Figure 5, bottom right),
we observe the highest percentage of 20X status codes
(approximately 80%), indicating that REST-ler then ex-
ercises a larger part of the service logic, as also confirmed
by coverage data (Figure 5, top right).
Second, when ignoring dependencies among request
types, we see that no 500 status code are detected (Fig-
ure 5, bottom left), while REST-ler finds a handful of
500 status codes when using dependencies among re-
quest types (see (Figure 5, bottom left and bottom right).
These 500 responses are triggered by the unhandled ex-
ception we planted in our blog posts service after a PUT
blog update request with a checksum matching the previ-
ous blog post’s body (see Section 4.1). As expected, ig-
noring dependencies among request types does not find
this bug (Figure 5, bottom left). In contrast, analyzing
dependencies across request types and using the check-
sum returned by a previous GET /posts/id request in
a subsequent PUT /posts/id update request with the
same id does trigger the bug. Morever, when also us-
ing dynamic feedback, the search space is pruned while
preserving this bug, which is then found with the least
number of tests (Figure 5, bottom right).
Overall, these experiments illustrate the complemen-
tarity between using dependencies among request types
and using dynamic feedback, and show that both are
needed for effective REST API fuzzing.
4.3 Deeper Service Exploration
In this section, we use GitLab to determine whether tests
generated by REST-ler exercise more service-side logic
and code as sequence length increases (Q2). In total, Git-
Lab has 63 API groups and REST-ler identifies 358 API
request types after analyzing GitLab’s Swagger specifi-
cation [12, 15]. Here, we constrain our investigation to
five of GitLab’s API groups, related to usual operations
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API Requests
Tested
Seq.
Len.
Coverage
Increase
Tests seqSet
Size
Dynamic
Objects
Commits 4 / 10 1 498 1 1 1
2 959 66 5 66
3 1453 483 93 900
4 1486 7300 2153 18663
Branches 5 / 7 1 498 1 1 1
2 926 5 3 5
3 969 23 14 37
4 986 139 82 289
5 988 911 516 2119
6 1026 4700 5652 12371
Issues 14 / 25 1 498 1 1 1
2 879 514 257 514
3 1158 8400 6964 16718
Repos 3 / 11 1 498 1 1 1
2 871 18 5 18
3 937 231 25 640
4 954 1424 125 4611
5 1030 5200 909 20713
Groups 10 / 20 1 687 25 25 1
2 718 1250 1225 1226
3 798 7900 13421 12466
Table 1: Testing Common GitLab APIs with REST-ler.
Shows the increase in sequence length, code coverage, tests
executed, seqSet size, and the number of dynamic objects
being created, until a 5-hours timeout is reached. Longer re-
quest sequences gradually increase service-side code coverage.
with commits, branches, issues and issue notes, reposi-
tories and repository files, and groups and group mem-
bership. We target 36 out of 73 request types defined
for the API groups under investigation, and also include
a POST /projects request, which is a common root
dependency for all five API groups. Indeed, we focus
on request types with POST, PUT, and DELETE HTTP
methods, which may modify the service’s internal state
by creating, updating and deleting resources, but we omit
request types with GET methods which are here simple
accessors and cause an unnecessary state space explo-
sion.
For each API group, Table 1 gives the number of re-
quest types included in that API as well as the number
of request types tested by REST-ler within the API (sec-
ond column). The Table presents results of experiments
performed with all five GitLab sub-APIs by the main
test-generation algorithm of Figure 4 (thus using BFS)
with a 5-hours timeout and while limiting the number
of fuzzable primitive-types combinations to maximum
1,000 combinations per request. Between experiments,
we reboot the entire GitLab service to restart from the
same initial state. For each API, as time goes by, the
Table shows the increase (going down) in the sequence
length, code coverage, tests executed, seqSet size, and
the number of dynamic objects being created, until the
5-hours timeout is reached.
Code Coverage. We collect code coverage data by con-
figuring Ruby’s Class: TracePoint hook to trace
GitLab’s service/lib folder. Table 1 shows the cu-
mulative code coverage achieved after executed all the
request sequences generated by REST-ler for each se-
quence length, or until the 5-hours timeout expires. The
results are incremental on top of 14,468 lines of code ex-
ecuted during service boot.
From Table 1, we can see a clear pattern across all five
experiments: longer sequence lengths consistently lead
to increased service-side code coverage. This is not sur-
prising, especially for small sequence lengths, as some
of the service functionality can only be exercised after at
least a few requests are executed.
As an example, consider the GitLab functionality of
“selecting a commit”. According to GitLab’s specifica-
tion, selecting a commit requires two dynamic objects,
a project-id and a commit-id, and the following depen-
dencies of requests is implicit: (1) a user needs to create
a project, (2) use the respective project-id to post a new
commit, and then (3) select the commit using its commit-
id and the respective project-id. Clearly, this operation
can only be performed by sequences of three requests or
more. For the Commit APIs, note the gradual increase
in coverage from 498 to 959 to 1,453 lines of code for
sequence lengths of one, two, and three, respectively.
As is also expected, for API groups with fewer re-
quests (e.g., Commits, Repos, and Branches), REST-ler’s
BFS reaches deeper sequences within the 5-hour time
budget. Most notably, for the Branches API, service-side
code coverage keeps gradually increasing for sequences
of length up to five, and then reaches 1,026 lines when
the 5-hours limit expires. In contrast, for API groups
with more requests (e.g., Issues and Groups), REST-ler
generates a higher number of shallow sequences before
reaching the 5-hours timeout.
Tests, Sequence Sets, and Dynamic Objects. In addi-
tion to code coverage, Table 1 also shows the increase in
the number of tests executed, the size of seqSet after
the RENDER function returns (in line 10 of Figure 4),
and the number of dynamic objects created by REST-ler
in order to get that increased code coverage. We can
clearly see that all those numbers are quickly growing,
because the search space is rapidly growing as its depth
increases and because of the BFS search strategy used
here.
Nevertheless, we emphasize that, without the two key
techniques evaluated in Section 4.2, this growth would
be much worse. For instance, for the Commit API, the
SeqSet size is 2,153 and there are 18,663 dynamic ob-
jects created by REST-ler for sequences of length up to
four. By comparison, since the Commit API has four
request types with an average of 17 rendering combi-
nations, the number of all possible rendered request se-
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API Time(hours)
BFS RandomWalk Intersection
Cov. Len. Cov. Len. (restarts) Cov.
Commits 1 65 4 0 10 1420
3 45 4 0 12 1441
5 44 4 0 14 (116) 1442
Branches 1 0 6 0 21 988
3 0 6 0 21 988
5 38 6 0 24 (462) 988
Issues 1 0 3 80 9 1020
3 36 3 3 15 1119
5 39 3 3 15 (60) 1119
Repos 1 90 5 0 12 940
3 90 5 0 14 940
5 90 5 0 14 (138) 940
Groups 1 0 3 31 23 754
3 0 3 25 31 760
5 28 3 16 31 (197) 770
Table 2: Search Strategies and Code Coverage. Compares
test results for GitLab APIs using the BFS and RandomWalk
search strategies, after 1, 3, and 5 hours. The table shows the
maximum length of request sequences and the unique lines of
code covered by each search strategy, as well as their intersec-
tion (excluding service-boot coverage). For RandomWalk, the
total number of restarts after 5 hours is also shown in parenthe-
sis. Although both strategies mostly cover overlapping lines of
code, some are covered only by one or the other. Overall, after
5 hours, BFS often generates the best coverage.
quences of up to length four is already more than 21
millions, and a naive brute-force enumeration of those
would already be untractable.
Still, even with the two core techniques used in REST-
ler, the search space explodes quickly, and we evaluate
other search strategies next.
4.4 Search Strategies
We now present results of experiments with the search
strategies BFS, RandomWalk, and BFS-Fast defined in
Section 3. We start by comparing BFS with Ran-
domWalk.
Code Coverage. Table 2 shows the unique lines of code
covered by BFS and RandomWalk, as well as their in-
tersection (excluding service-boot coverage), after 1, 3,
and 5 hours of search. The Table also shows the maxi-
mum length of request sequences generated so far and,
for RandomWalk, the total number of restarts after 5
hours in parenthesis.
We observe that both search strategies quickly con-
verge to an overlapping set of lines of code. After 5 hours
of search, BFS often generates the best coverage. How-
ever, in the Issues and Groups APIs, there are still some
lines of code covered only by BFS or by RandomWalk.
By construction, BFS provides full-grammar cover-
age whenever it increases its sequence length, and this
feature seems to pay off when measuring service-side
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Fig. 6: Distribution of HTTP Status Codes for GitLab APIs.
Shows the HTTP status codes collected during testing with BFS
and RandomWalk. Different search strategies exercise the ser-
vice under test differently.
coverage. In contrast, RandomWalk goes deeper faster
but without providing full-grammar coverage. The ef-
fects on coverage of these two different search strategies
is more visible on broader APIs and search spaces with
more request types, like the Issues and Groups APIs (see
Table 1). After 1 hour of search for these two APIs,
RandomWalk has a head-start of, respectively, 80 and 31
lines of code in coverage compared to BFS. However, af-
ter 5 hours of search, BFS coverage has caught up with
RandomWalk and is now overall better.
HTTP Status Codes. Figure 6 shows the distribution
of HTTP status codes collected during 5 hours of testing
of each of the GitLab APIs with BFS and RandomWalk.
Focusing on each API group separately, we can see that
the distributions obtained with BFS and RandomWalk
are different. Both search strategies seem to exercise the
service-under test differently. For instance, in the Com-
mits, Issues and Groups APIs, only RandomWalk trig-
gers 404 status codes. Yet in the Commits case, BFS’s
coverage is strictly better (see Table 2). Another interest-
ing difference is that, in the Commits and Repos APIs,
RandomWalk triggers at least three times more 500 “In-
ternal Server Error” status codes than BFS. We use those
500 status codes to detect bugs, and we will discuss
those more in Sections 4.5 and 5.
Overall, the differences in coverage and HTTP status-
code distribution profiles obtained with BFS and Ran-
domWalk motivate us to explore trade-offs between these
two extreme search strategies. Specifically, we now eval-
uate such a trade-off, namely BFS-Fast.
Comparison with BFS-Fast. Like RandomWalk, BFS-
Fast goes deeper faster than BFS. But like BFS, BFS-Fast
still provides full-grammar coverage when increasing se-
quence length.
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API Time(hours)
BFS-Fast BFS
Len. Cov. seqSet Len. Cov. seqSet
Commits 1 10 1482 - 4 1485 -
3 14 1482 - 4 1486 -
5 17 1482 6 4 1486 2153
Branches 1 22 974 - 6 988 -
3 42 974 - 6 988 -
5 42 974 6 6 1026 5652
Issues 1 4 1100 - 3 1020 -
3 5 1150 - 3 1155 -
5 5 1150 272 3 1158 6964
Repos 1 12 935 - 5 1030 -
3 18 972 - 5 1030 -
5 23 986 13 5 1030 909
Groups 1 13 772 - 3 754 -
3 19 772 - 3 760 -
5 21 772 31 3 798 13421
Table 3: Comparison of BFS-Fast and BFS over Time.
Shows the maximum sequence length and the increase in lines
of code covered (excluding service-boot coverage) obtained
with each search strategy after 1, 3, and 5 hours. The seqSet
size is also shown after 5 hours. Although BFS covers slightly
more lines of code, BFS-Fast reaches deeper request sequences
and maintains a much smaller seqSet size.
Table 3 presents results of experiments comparing
BFS-Fast with BFS. The Table shows the maximum se-
quence length and the increase in lines of code covered
(excluding service-boot coverage) by each search strat-
egy after 1, 3, and 5 hours. The seqSet size is also
shown after 5 hours.
We can see that, although BFS covers slightly more
lines of code, BFS-Fast reaches deeper request sequences
and maintains a much smaller seqSet size. With BFS-
Fast, the set seqSet remains consistently small: at each
iteration when the sequence length increases, the func-
tion EXTEND only creates one new sequence per request
type; then this set is in turn expanded by the function
RENDER, but then shrinks again as many fuzzing com-
binations lead to invalid responses. This explains why
seqSet tends to oscillate and stabilize around small
sizes as the search goes deeper.
In practice, controling the size of seqSet is key to
scalability when reaching greater depths during longer
searches, or when facing broader search spaces due to
larger APIs with more request types. This is why we
adopt BFS-Fast as the default search strategy used in
REST-ler.
Although code coverage with BFS-Fast is slightly less
than with BFS after 5 hours of search, BFS-Fast actu-
ally detects all the 500HTTP status codes found by BFS
within 5 hours, as well as those found by RandomWalk,
as discussed in the next section.
4.5 Bug Bucketization
Before discussing real errors found with REST-ler, we
introduce a bucketization scheme to cluster the numer-
ous 500 “Internal Server Errors” that can sometimes be
reported. Indeed, as usual when fuzzing, different in-
stances of a same bug can be repeatedly found over and
over again. Since all the bugs found have to be inspected
by the user, it is therefore important in practice to fa-
cilitate this analysis by identifying likely-redundant in-
stances of a same unique bug.
In our context, we define a bug as a 500 HTTP status
code being received after executing a request sequence.
Thus, every bug found is associated with the request se-
quence that was executed to find it. Given this prop-
erty, we use the following bucketization procedure for
the bugs found by REST-ler:
Whenever a new bug is found during the
search, we compute all non-empty suffixes of
its request sequence (starting with the small-
est one), and we check whether some suffix is
a previously-recorded request sequence lead-
ing to a bug found earlier during the search. If
there is a match, the new bug is added to the
bucket of that previous bug. Otherwise, a new
bucket is created with the new bug and its re-
quest sequence.
Note that, in the above procedure, requests in request
sequences are identified by their type, not by how they
are rendered – fuzzable pritimitive types are not taken
into account, and requests rendered differently are al-
ways considered equivalent. For a request sequence of
length n, there are n suffixes. When using BFS or BFS-
Fast, this bucketization scheme will identify bugs by the
shortest request sequence needed to find it.
For the 5-hours experiments with GitLab reported ear-
lier in this section, REST-ler found bugs (500 HTTP
status codes) in two out of the five GitLab API groups
(see Figure 6). After bucketization, there are two buck-
ets found for the Commits API, two buckets found for
the Repos API, and none for the Branches, Issues, and
Groups APIs. Note that all four buckets are found within
5 hours by BFS, RandomWalk, and BFS-Fast.
Figure 7 depicts the (unrendered) request sequence of
length 2 identifying one of the bug buckets found for the
Commits API. This request sequence triggers a 500 “In-
ternal Server Error” when a user creates a project and
then posts a commit with an empty branch name – that
is, when the second request is rendered with its branch
field being the empty string. This specific error can
be reached by numerous longer sequences (e.g., creat-
ing two projects and posting a commit with an empty
branch name) and multiple value renderings (e.g., any
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1/2: POST /api/v4/projects HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json
Content−Type: application/json
Host: 127.0.0.1
PRIVATE−TOKEN: [FILTERED]
’{”name”:restler fuzzable(”string”)}’
2/2: POST /api/v4/projects/projectid/repository/commits HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json
Content−Type: application/json
Host: 127.0.0.1
PRIVATE−TOKEN: [FILTERED]
’{
”branch”: restler fuzzable(”string”),
”commit message”: restler fuzzable(”string”),
”actions”:
[
{
”action”: [”create”, ”delete”, ”move”, ”update”],
”file path”: restler fuzzable(”string”),
”content”: restler fuzzable(”string”),
}
]
}’ 
Fig. 7: Sample REST-ler Bug Bucket. This request sequence
identifies a unique bug found in GitLab’s Commits API. The
sequence consists of two requests: the first POST request cre-
ates a project, and the second POST request uses the id of that
new project and posts a commit with some action and some file
path.
feasible “content” rendering along with an empty branch
name). Nevertheless, the above bucketization proce-
dure will group together all those variants into the same
bucket.
We discuss the details causing this error as well
as other unique bugs in the following section. In-
deed, REST-ler also found unique bugs in the Groups,
Branches, and Issues GitLab APIs when running longer
fuzzing experiments.
5 New Bugs Found in GitLab
In this section we discuss “unique bugs” (i.e., after buck-
etization) found so far by REST-ler during experiments
with the GitLab APIs. Note that REST-ler does not report
false alarms and that all unique bugs were so far rather
easily reproducible, unless otherwise specified. All the
bugs reported in this section were found by REST-ler
while running for at most 24 hours.
Early in our experiments, REST-ler found a first
bug in the Branches API when using a fuzzing dictio-
nary which included a (1-byte) “\0” string as one of
its values. The bug seems due to a parsing issue in
ruby-grape, a ruby middleware library for creating
REST APIs [30]. Since other GitLab APIs also depend
on the ruby-grape library, the bug is easy to trigger
when using a dictionary with a “\0” string. In other
words, many bugs in different buckets as defined in the
previous section point to that same common root cause.
In order to eliminate this “noise” in our experiments, we
subsequently removed that dictionary value for the ex-
periments of Section 4 and for those that led to discover
the bugs discussed below. We now describe additional
bugs found per API group.
Commits. In the Commits API, REST-ler found three
bugs. The first one is triggered by the request sequence
shown in Figure 7 when the branch name in the second
request is set to an empty string. According to GitLab’s
documentation [12], users can post commits with mul-
tiple files and actions, including action “create“, which
creates a file with a given content on a selected target
branch. For performance benefits, GitLab uses rugged
bindings to native libgit2, a pure C implementation
of the Git core methods [22]. Due to incomplete input
validation, an invalid branch name, like an empty string,
can be passed between the two different layers of ab-
straction as follows. The ruby code checks if the tar-
get branch exists by invoking a native C function whose
return value is expected to be either NULL or an exist-
ing entry. However, if an unmatched entry type (e.g., an
empty string) is passed to the C function, an exception
is raised. Yet, this exception is unexpected/unhandled by
the higher-level ruby code, and thus causes a 500 “Inter-
nal Server Error”. The bug can easily be reproduced by
creating a project and posting a commit with action “cre-
ate” to a branch whose name is set to the empty string.
A second bug found by REST-ler seems similar: (1)
create a project, (2) post a valid commit with action “cre-
ate”, and then (3) cherry-pick the commit to a branch
whose name is set to the empty string. Both bugs seem
due to similar improper validation of branch names.
A third bug found by REST-ler is slightly different:
(1) create a project, and then (2) create a commit with
action “move” and omit the “previous path” field from
the action’s parameters. In this case, the bug is due to an
incomplete validation of the “previous path” field. We
do not know how severe this specific bug is, but there
have been past security vulnerabilities in GitLab due to
improper file-paths validation, which could have been
exploited by an attacker to perform unauthorized move
operations and leak private data [16].
Repos. In the Repos API, REST-ler found two bugs. The
first one is triggered when a user attempts to (1) create
a project, and then (2) create a file using a dictionary
of parameters in which either the author’s email or the
author’s name (optional parameters) is set to the empty
string. The bug seems due to incomplete input valida-
tion and error propagation between different layers of
abstraction. Specifically, ruby code invokes native code
from libgit2 which attempts to parse commit options
11
and create a commit signature, using the author’s name
and email. In case an empty string is encountered in the
author’s name of email field, an unexpected/unhandled
exception is raised to the ruby code causing a 500 “In-
ternal Server Error”.
The second bug is similar, but requires a deeper se-
quence of actions in order to be triggered: (1) create a
project, (2) create a file, and (3) edit the file content with
an empty author email or author name. Note that both
bugs seem to be due to the same piece of code.
Groups. For the Groups API, REST-ler found a bug
which can be triggered by creating a new group using
an invalid parent group id. According to GitLab’s doc-
umentation, users can create new groups and option-
ally define group nesting by providing a parent group id
through a parameter named “parent id”. If group nest-
ing is defined, the ACLs of the new group must be at
least as restricted as those of the parent. However, the
ruby code responsible for enforcing such a relationship
between ACLs uses “parent id” to access the respective
ACLs without checking whether “parent id” lies within a
range of valid integers for activerecord. Therefore,
using a large integer value in the field of the “parent id”
param causes a RangeError exception. Furthermore,
after manual inspection, we realized that assigning to
“parent id” any integer value which is currently not as-
signed to an existing group will also cause a NilClass
excetion. This is because there is always an attempt to
access the ACLs of an object without first checking that
the target object actually exists.
Branches and Issues. Finally, for both the Branches and
the Issues APIs REST-ler found 500 “Internal Server Er-
rors” when running in parallel fuzzing mode, where mul-
tiple request sequences are being tested concurrently. For
instance, one such bug can be reproduced as follows: (1)
create a project, (2) create a valid branch and at the same
time (e.g., using a second process) create another branch
on the same project. To successfully reproduce this bug,
one needs to make the two requests simultaneously in or-
der for both of them to be within a small time window in
which some internal book-keeping is being performed.
These bugs seem due to concurrency issues and may be
related to the attacks on database-backed web applica-
tions presented by Warszawski et al. [39].
Discussion. From the description of the bugs found so
far with REST-ler we see an emerging two-fold pattern.
First, REST-ler produces a sequence of requests that ex-
ercise a service deep enough so that it reaches a particular
interesting and valid “state”. Second, while the service
under test is in such a state, REST-ler produces an addi-
tional request with an unexpected fuzzed primitive type
– like a string containing “\0” or an empty string. There-
fore, triggering a bug requires a combination of these two
features. We believe that REST-ler already does a good
job at exercising a service deep enough, thanks to its de-
pendency analysis. However, more fuzzing values and
more properties to check in responses could boost REST-
ler’s bug-finding capabilities – there is clearly room for
improvement here.
We emphasize that the findings reported in this sec-
tion are still preliminary. The bugs found so far are input
validation bugs whose severity could range from mere
crashes (which might only cause Denial-Of-Service at-
tacks in the worst case) to more subtle access-control
bugs (which might cause service state corruption or
private-information disclosure). At the time of this writ-
ing, we are in communication with the GitLab develop-
ers, and we will update the next version of this paper with
their feedback.
6 Related Work
The lightweight static analysis of Swagger specifications
done by REST-ler (see Section 2) in order to infer depen-
dencies among request types is similar to the analysis
of type dependencies performed by the Randoop algo-
rithm [27] for typed object-oriented programs. However,
unlike in the Randoop work, dynamic objects in Swag-
ger specifications are untyped, and REST-ler has to infer
those somehow, as best as it can. Sometimes, user help
may be required to unblock REST-ler when a Swagger
specification is not complete, for instance, when a type
of resource is not described in the Swagger specification
itself, such as authentication and authorization tokens for
allowing a test client to access a service. In the future, it
would be interesting to allow users to annotate Swag-
ger specifications and to declare service-specific types
as well as their properties, in the spirit of code con-
tracts [24, 4].
The dynamic feedback REST-ler uses to prune invalid
responses from the search space (see line 32 in Figure 4)
is also similar to the feedback used in Randoop [27].
However, the Randoop search strategy (in particular,
search pruning and ordering) is different from the three
simple strategies considered in our work, namely BFS,
BFS-Fast and RandomWalk (the latter being the closest
to Randoop). Moreover, some of the optimizations of the
Randoop search algorithm (related to object equality and
filtering) are not directly applicable and relevant in our
context. Of course, other search strategies could be used,
and it would be worth exploring those in our context in
future work.
Our BFS-Fast search strategy is inspired by test gener-
ation algorithms used in model-based testing [38], whose
goal is to generate a minimum number of tests covering,
say, every state and transition of a finite-state machine
model (e.g., see [40]) in order to generate a test suite to
check conformance of a (blackbox) implementation with
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respect to that model. It is also related to algorithms for
generating tests from an input grammar while covering
all its production rules [21]. Indeed, in our context, BFS-
Fast provides, by construction, a full grammar coverage
up to the given current sequence length. The number of
request sequences it generates is not necessarily minimal,
but that number was always small, hence manageable, in
our experiments so far.
Since REST API requests and responses are transmit-
ted over HTTP, HTTP-fuzzers can be used to fuzz REST
APIs. Such fuzzers, like Burp [7], Sulley [34], Boo-
Fuzz [6], or the commercial AppSpider [3] or Qualys’s
WAS [29], can capture/replay HTTP traffic, parse HTTP
requests/responses and their contents (like embedded
JSON data), and then fuzz those, using either pre-defined
heuristics [3, 29] or user-defined rules [34, 6]. Tools
to capture, parse, fuzz, and replay HTTP traffic have
recently been extended to leverage Swagger specifica-
tions in order to parse HTTP requests and guide their
fuzzing [3, 29, 37, 2]. Compared to those tools, the
main originality of REST-ler is its global dependency
analysis of Swagger specifications and its ability to in-
telligently generate sequences of requests without pre-
recorded HTTP traffic.
General-purpose (i.e., non-Swagger specific)
grammar-based fuzzers, like Peach [28] and SPIKE [32],
among others [35], can also be used to fuzz REST
APIs. With these tools, the user directly specifies
an input grammar, often encoded directly by code
specifying what and how to fuzz, similar to the code
shown on the right of Figure 2. Compared to those tools,
REST-ler generates automatically an input grammar
from a Swagger specification, and its fuzzing rules
are determined separatety and automatically by the
algorithm of Figure 4.
How to learn automatically input grammars from input
samples is another complementary research area [20, 5,
19]. REST-ler currently relies on a Swagger specification
to represent a service’s input space, and it learns automat-
ically how to prune invalid request sequences by analyz-
ing service responses at specific states. Still, a Swagger
specification could be further refined given representa-
tive (unit tests) or live traffic in order to focus the search
towards specific areas of the input space. For services
with REST APIs but no Swagger specification, it would
be worth investigating how to infer it automatically from
runtime traffic logs using machine learning, or by a static
analysis of the code implementing the API.
Grammar-based fuzzing can also be combined [23, 17]
with whitebox fuzzing [18], which uses dynamic sym-
bolic execution, constraint generation and solving in or-
der to generate new tests exercising new code paths. In
contrast, REST-ler is currently purely blackbox: the in-
ner workings of the service under test are invisible to
REST-ler which only sees REST API requests and re-
sponses. Since cloud services are usually complex dis-
tributed systems whose components are written in dif-
ferent languages, general symbolic-execution-based ap-
proaches seem problematic, but it would be worth ex-
ploring this option further. For instance, in the short
term, REST-ler could be extended to take into account
alerts (e.g., assertion violations) reported in back-end
logs in order to increase chances of finding interesting
bugs and correlating them to specific request sequences.
The GitLab concurrency-related bugs we reported in
the previous section look similar to known classes of
bugs and attacks in database-backed applications [39].
These bugs are due to concurrent database operations
that are not properly encapsulated in serializable trans-
actions. When a REST API exposes concurrent database
operations without properly isolating those, data corrup-
tions and leaks may happen. It would be interesting to
develop concurrency-specific fuzzing rules inspired by
the attack techniques of [39] and to experiment with
those in REST-ler.
In practice, the main technique used today to ensure
the security of cloud services is so-called “penetration
testing”, or pen testing for short, which means security
experts review the architecture, design and code of cloud
services from a security perspective. Since pen testing is
labor intensive, it is expensive and limited in scope and
depth. Fuzzing tools like REST-ler can partly automate
and improve the discovery of specific classes of security
vulnerabilities, and are complementary to pen testing.
7 Conclusions
We introduced REST-ler, the first automatic intelligent
tool for fuzzing cloud services through their REST APIs.
REST-ler analyzes a Swagger specification of a REST
API, and generates tests intelligently by inferring depen-
dencies among request types and by learning invalid re-
quest combinations from the service’s responses. We
presented empirical evidence showing that these tech-
niques are necessary to thoroughly exercise a service
while pruning its large search space of possible request
sequences. We also evaluated three different search
strategies on GitLab, a large popular open-source self-
hosted Git service. Although REST-ler is still an early
prototype, it was already able to find several new bugs in
GitLab, including security-related ones.
While still preliminary, our results are encouraging.
How general are these results? To find out, we need to
fuzz more services through their REST APIs, add more
fuzzing rules to further confuse and trip service APIs,
and check more properties to detect different kinds of
bugs and security vulnerabilities. Indeed, unlike buffer
overflows in binary-format parsers, or use-after-free bugs
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in web browsers, or cross-site-scripting attacks in web-
pages, it is still largely unclear what security vulnerabil-
ities might hide behind REST APIs. While past human-
intensive pen testing efforts targeting cloud services pro-
vide evidence that such vulnerabilities do exist, this ev-
idence is still too anecdotical, and new automated tools,
like REST-ler, are needed for more systematic answers.
How many bugs can be found by fuzzing REST APIs?
How security-critical will they be? This paper provides
a clear path forward to answer these questions.
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